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 Introduction: in-depth longitudinal case study of Fanuc１ 
 This case presents and analyzes the longitudinal process of Fanuc’s growth from small 
business born as a venture within Fujitsu until becoming the world's leading factory automation 
(FA) company. It shows the mechanisms behind Fanuc’s sustained growth past more than 40 
years.  
 
1. Overview of Fanuc and the machine tool industry 
In the period of more than a quarter century since 1982, the Japanese production of machine tool kept 
its top position in the world, as depicted below in Figure 1. It is to be contrasted with the Japanese 
electronics industry including the LCD TV industry, which spectacularly emerged as the world top 
player in late 1980s, but whose dominance in the world market was short-lived in retrospect.  
Source：American Machinist, Gardner Publications, Inc.'s data was used to make this graph by Japan machine tool builders’ Association.
Footnotes:
1. Before 1990s,<Russia> means [Soviet Union], and <Germany> means [west Germany].
2. Modeling tool is not included.
3. The data of 2013 is estimated in February, 2014. And the data of 2012 is a revised edition.
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Machine tools are often referred to as “mother machines” because they are machines that 
create other goods such as automobiles and electrical appliances. Automobile companies have a 
lot of machine tool to manufacture cars in their factory. Accordingly, competitiveness in the 
machine tool industry is intimately tied in with the competitiveness of other entire 
manufacturing industries.  
The Japanese machine tool industry came to have such competitiveness because it was 
underpinned by the superior functionality of its NC machine tools, i.e., machine tools controlled 
with NC (Numerical Control) devices. In Japan, compared to Germany or America, the share of 
NC-type cutting machine tools was extremely large in the cutting machine market, and one of 
the chief factors that enabled Japan to produce many superior NC machine tools was the 
existence of NC device supplier Fanuc. Japanese machine tool manufacturers left the design and 
production of NC devices completely up to Fanuc, which enabled them to pour their efforts into 
innovating the machine tool itself other than NC devices.  
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The “Made in America” report from the MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity survey 
states the following: (Dertouzos, 1990) 
 
“NC and NC machine tools give businesses the flexibility and automation needed to provide 
small amounts of, and a wide range of parts for the automotive, electronics and machine 
industries etc., just-in-time.” 
 
“NC design and production for NC machine tools in Japan is all done by Fanuc, a single 
company. This is not so that Japan can gain an economic advantage of scale, but to solve the 
problem of compatibility that has troubled American machine tool users.” 
 
Since gaining independence from Fujitsu in 1972, to date Fanuc has achieved close to 50% of 
the global market share, and has sustained an extremely high business profitability of around 
30%.  
Figure 2 Fanuc History in Performance Indicators
 
2 Tracing the growth of Fanuc 
It’s possible to conceptualize Fanuc's growth as 3 historical phases (see Figure 3). Phase 1, from 
1956 to 1972, is the phase beginning with the company's inauguration as a venture within 
Fujitsu to its separation from Fujitsu. Phase 2 corresponds to the successful technological 
transformations the company achieved with implementation of DC servo motors and MPU 
(microprocessor unit), leading to the establishment of its present-day technological systems. 
This meant the establishment of dominant design of NC device (Anderson and Tushman, 1990) 
corresponding to the period up to 1980. Phase 3 is then the following period of dramatic market 
expansion in which the company brought about bestselling NC device, called series 0. 
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Following, we described each phase of Fanuc's growth trajectory in sequence. 
1956 Numeric control (NC) discovered by Seiuemon Inaba
1959 - 2 important discoveries 
(algebraic pulse distribution system, electric hydraulic pulse monitor)
1969 - Fully modularized NC (FANUC 260) completed
1974 - Partnership with Gettys, DC servo motor completed
1972 - Company separates from Fujitsu
1975 – NC with MPU (FANUC 2000C) completed
1978 - NC with Intel 8086 (System 6) completed
1985 - Global bestseller NC (Series 0) completed
Phase 1
Figure 3  Stages of Growth at Fanuc
Phase 2
Phase 3
 
2.1. Phase 1 (1956 to 1972) 
(1) Creation of an internal venture business 
To understand Fanuc's history, we have to look back as far as 1956. Technical director at Fujitsu 
at the time, Hanzo Omi, made the decision to break into the new field of computers and 
controllers beyond communications, and appointed Toshio Ikeda and Seiuemon Inaba as those 
respective project leaders. At the time, Fujitsu was only involved in communications equipment, 
and Ikeda and Inaba were simply instructed to find out what could be done in the new fields. 
However, there were many options for control related technologies, and the NC development 
theme eventually put forth by Inaba was not a simple discovery. In particular, Inaba, a 
mechanical engineer who had graduated from the school of precision engineering at Tokyo 
University, had to search for a field dealing with machine controllers that was not the same as 
the process control field which already had an established market at the time. In the midst of 
trial and error in which a development theme had been difficult to determine, Inaba discovered 
the NC theme when looking at a copy of the MIT report (Dertouzos, 1990). 
The first time that Inaba had heard of the MIT report was in October of 1956 at a conference 
held on automatic control at Waseda University. At the conference, the then California 
University Professor, Yasuto Takahashi, showed Inaba a copy of the Scientific American 
featuring an article about NC milling machines. Inaba said the following about his sentiments 
when he first saw the MIT report. 
 
“Since my background are in the mechanical engineering, I remember a sense of strong 
interest in servo mechanisms the moment I first heard about the MIT report, and I immediately 
got consent from my boss, Director Omi, to set the R&D theme as NC for the machine control 
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team.…Then, the MIT report introduced to me by Professor Yasuto Takahashi became like a 
bible for our research for sometime…２.” 
 
In this way, Inaba discovered the new field of NC, finished his trial-and-error efforts to find 
out what could be done, and went on to execute a new business strategy. At that time, Inaba’s 
development project team was a completely separate organization within Fujitsu from the 
company's existing communications equipment departments, and top management at Fujitsu had 
given the team a certain level of autonomy and freedom.  
 
 (2) The invention of the algebraic electric hydraulic pulse motor 
Numeric control began at the Fujitsu Nakahara Factory laboratory with a project team 
consisting of four or five engineers from both the electric and mechanical fields. At the time, 
Inaba, a team leader who had only just reached his 30s, pushed forward with development. The 
first prototype was then achieved in 1957. As previously stated, the critical areas in NC are the 
computing and servo mechanisms. This prototype adopted a new element called the Parametron 
invented by Eiichi Goto of Tokyo University, and was an NC system that employed electric 
servo motors for its servo mechanisms３. 
In 1958, Makino Milling Machine Co and Fujitsu jointly exhibited an NC milling machine at 
the Osaka International Trade Fair, however it wasn't a machine that could withstand practical 
application. Then in 1959, Hitachi Seiki and Fujitsu delivered an NC milling machine to 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Nagoya Aircraft Works. This could have been said to be the first 
commercialized NC product, but it had a problem in that it blew an average of 1 electronic 
vacuum tube every day. 
In this trial-and-error process, Inaba brought together his own knowledge of mechanical 
engineering, and Fujitsu's know-how about digital circuitry with the knowledge in the MIT 
report, and through repeated prototyping experiments with NC machine tools, all of this 
knowledge accumulated and became embodied as the tacit knowledge of the Inaba team.  
 
All of this came to fruition with the following epoch-making invention. In 1959, Inaba and his 
team invented the revolutionary “algebraic pulse distribution system” and the “electric hydraulic 
pulse motor.” These two technological innovations enabled dramatic improvement in NC 
performance which was recognized both in Japan and internationally with a number of awards. 
The organization responsible for this invention was the project team in Fujitsu that the company 
referred to as “Inaba’s NC Brigade” or the “Inaba Family.” The algebraic pulse distribution 
system was brought about through joint research with University. Inaba said the following: 
 
“Aiming for devices that can be put to practical use, we would like to produce stability and 
reliability in both the circuitry and the servos. We were fortunate to have been greatly inspired 
by electrical engineering Assistant professor Tatsu Motooka of Tokyo University Engineering 
Department, and his assistant, currently Tokyo University Institute of Industrial Science 
Professor Kusuo Yamaguchi. We dispatched an engineer from the Automatic Control 
Department as it was called at the time, which effectively became the brains of the development 
from where we received guidance４.” 
 
As a result of this joint research, the invention of the “algebraic pulse distribution circuit” - 
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technology that could calculate the combinations of arcs and straight lines that make up the 
forms of mechanical parts - came into being. Since its establishment, Fanuc has been extremely 
proactive in bringing in knowledge from universities . 
Fanuc's adoption of open loop electric/hydraulic pulse motors was opposite to the closed-loop 
DC motors adopted in the United States５. Electric hydraulic pulse motors consist of an electric 
pulse motor and a hydraulic servo, in which the output from the electric pulse motor is 
amplified by hydraulics enabling significant power. Later on, when Fanuc was established, this 
technology was invented and patented by Inaba himself, although he got the idea from the 
automatic exchange equipment that were being built by Fujitsu at the time. Inaba reminisced on 
those times as follows: 
 
“I couldn't ask the professors about the servo, so I had to think up something myself, but then I 
recalled the automatic exchange equipment that Fujitsu had been manufacturing６.” 
 
From that idea, Inaba imagined driving a motor by inputting pulses, and went on to prototype 
the electric pulse motor. However, this pulse motor alone was unsatisfactory in that was not able 
to deliver much torque, so Inaba imagined amplifying the torque by combining the pulse motor 
with a hydraulic motor. This was the bones of Inaba’s invention. Inaba commented as follows: 
 
“The department of precision engineering from which I graduated was known as the school of 
armory before the war, and as the name suggests, it was artillery that I studied. The gun turrets 
on warships were driven by hydraulic motors. Using these hydraulic motors with NC servo 
mechanisms, I tried controlling flow with the electric pulse motor７”. 
 
As described above, Inaba did not only start out with closed innovation R&D initiatives in an 
organization within Fujitsu, but also made concerted efforts to bring in technical know-how 
from outside the company (Tokyo University and the MIT report) and thus promoted open 
innovation (Chesbrough, 2003). 
 
(3) Creating the NC market 
In 1959, through the process of prototyping, experimenting and assessing the 2 inventions, the 
performance of NC was dramatically improved, however market demand did not increase with 
speed and uncertainty of NC market continued. It was not until 1965 that the NC Department 
got profitable. In other words, it took nine years from Inaba’s discovery of the NC technology in 
1956 until the NC business turned a profit, but from then on, Fanuc's shipments of NC products 
rose dramatically from 388 units in 1965, 483 units in 1968, 1184 units in 1969, to 1684 units in 
1970.Following is the process of creating NC market. 
 
With the two inventions in 1959, the standard had already been set for NC performance and 
stability to meet the demands of practical application. Inaba said the following the 
circumstances at the time: 
 
“We had great confidence in the NC technology, but unfortunately the NC machine tool 
market was still quite small, and it wasn't easy to achieve sales. Therefore, our huge efforts went 
unrewarded and our monthly accounts remained in the red８.” 
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The NC machine tool market had not yet matured, but Inaba understood the nature of the 
market well. In other words, there is some critical point in a market, and until that critical point 
is reached, demand does not rise very much, but when it is, market demand expands rapidly. 
Inaba had the following to say about the growth of new market. 
 
“At a certain time, markets grow explosively. There are many companies that can't wait for 
that and give up, ending in failure. We endured that period patiently, and once 1966 came 
around the market for Japanese NC machine tools suddenly took off… (abbreviated)… That 
means we waited 10 years from 1956 when we first embarked on the development. That 
explosive growth continued afterwards, but those kinds of issues are things that a company must 
face９.” 
Even though he was unable to see growth in the market initially, Inaba continued with the NC 
development and proactively brought in new technologies. In actual fact, Fanuc shipped 
FANUC 220 using transistors in 1962, FANUC 260 with total integrated circuitry, and by 1969 
had succeeded with complete modularization, which accelerated growth in the NC machine tool 
market - the number of completely modularized units shipped in 1969 was three times that of 
the previous year. Fully modularized NC meant that the company could respond to a wide range 
of customer demands at low cost.  
The main reason for the losses the company experienced up to 1965 was custom orders. 
Custom orders grew vigorously as the sales department took any orders to extend order 
volume１０. However, custom-made products cost more than standardized products, and when the 
company investigated they found all of these orders were making a loss. To bring costs down, 
companies have to make a wide range of standardized parts, but to respond to the diverse 
demands of the market, custom-made items are also required, and the way to combine and 
overcome these contradictory aspects is full modularization. In other words, all the modules that 
Fanuc produces are standardized, but combining them as required enables the company to 
respond to various market demands. 
For example, the FANUC 260 is a range of functional modules created by analyzing the 
details of specifications demanded for a variety of machine tools. By mass-producing and 
stocking these, modules can be assembled to build an NC device to meet the specific needs of 
individual users. The modules are electronic circuits with specific functions created by 
combining a range of logical elements such as transistors and memory elements, which are 
mounted on separate printed circuits and units. See Figure 4 for an example of the FANUC 260 
configuration. 
FANUC 260 has three types of basic control units, about nine basic options, and about 20 
additional options, which means that more than 60 million combinations are possible. Moreover, 
modules can be connected with screws and cable connectors, enabling completely solder-free 
assembly using only screwdrivers and spanners. This makes it extremely easy to add functions. 
Thus, required functions can be added easily without having to do any rewiring on-site with the 
user. By adopting this completely modularized NC product architecture, Fanuc can respond to a 
wide range of market demands at low-cost, which in turn greatly contributes to further market 
expansion. 
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(4) Breaking away from Fujitsu 
When the NC Department moved into the black in 1965, the number of NC units produced with 
the expansion of the NC market stabilized, and the department was growing as high earner 
within the company. In fact, Fujitsu's profit ratio in 1970 was 6%, although the NC Department 
had achieved more than 20%. It was at this point that the investments made into the NC 
Department over more than 10 years began to bear fruit. 
However, in April of 1972, management at Fujitsu decided to separate the NC Department 
from the Fujitsu and form a new company, Fanuc. At the time, Fujitsu was facing enormous 
funding requirements needed to develop the Japanese-made computer. Therefore, since the 
long-term investments in NC had begun to bear fruit, it seemed like a rational judgment for 
Fujitsu to take the income from the NC Department and put it in the Computer Department. But 
Judging from the results past 40 years, it was obvious that separating Fanuc from Fujitsu would 
be right decision for business growth. 
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Figure 5 Organizational changes in each phase of Fanuc’s transformation
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2.2. Phase 2 (1973 to 1980) 
(1) Technical change from electric hydraulic pulse motors to DC servo motors 
The year after breaking away from Fujitsu in 1972, Fanuc was facing an unforeseen challenge. 
That was the first oil shock of 1973. As an opportunity, user assessment of the electric hydraulic 
pulse motors that Inaba had had absolute faith in began to change. There was a hydraulic pump 
was required to drive the electric hydraulic pulse motors, but the pump was extremely 
inefficient - for instance it took a 100 hp drive to get a 50 hp output. However, the electric 
hydraulic pulse monitor was the chief technology that had given Fanuc its unique position, and 
as mentioned, was invented by Inaba himself. For those reasons, in those circumstances, there 
was unusual attachment to Inaba’s electric hydraulic pulse monitor. In fact, Inaba said the 
following to his friend at Siemens at the time. 
 
“Taking the electric hydraulic pulse motor away would be the same as taking away my life１１.” 
 
But at the same time however, Inaba had been carrying out various experiments to try to find a 
new type of motor, which he recalled as follows: 
 
“At the time, I ordered two things, firstly I told Koyama to develop a new electric pulse motor 
in four months, and secondly I told Endo to investigate American company, Gettys motor１２.” 
 
In other words, firstly Inaba ordered Koyama to develop an oil-free high-power electric pulse 
motor in January of 1974. The electric pulse motor uses the same open loop method as the 
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electric hydraulic pulse motor, and even though it did not use oil, Inaba was still heavily 
committed towards the open loop-type pulse monitor. In addition to Koyama who was 
developing the electric pulse motor, Endo conducted a thorough survey of closed-loop DC servo 
motors as the alternative approach. 
Inaba prepared, just in case, to negotiate for technological partnership on the closed-loop DC 
servo motor with Gettys. Then as instructed, Koyama completed the electric pulse motor 
development within the allotted 4 months, in May of 1974. However, because the noise of this 
motor was extreme, Inaba decided it couldn't be used practically, and decided to do away with 
the open-loop technology of the pulse motor and switch over to the closed-loop DC servo 
motor. 
Once Inaba had made that decision, Fanuc engineers obtained schematics for the DC servo 
motors from their now technological partner Gettys in the United States, and completed a DC 
servo motor in a mere two months. Then in September that year, the company exhibited an NC 
device using DC servo motors at a machine tool fair in Osaka. This was actually a very 
important decision for Fanuc. Switching from the pulse motor to the servo motor, and from the 
open-loop to the closed-loop systems means the change of basic design concepts. Looking back 
on those times, Inaba said the following: 
 
“If my decision had been even just a little bit later, the share we now enjoy would probably 
have ended up with another company.… (abbreviated)… at the time, if I had stuck with the 
electric hydraulic pulse motor, the Fanuc we see today wouldn't have existed１３.” 
 
Inaba recalls those times as difficult ones. As the inventor of the electric hydraulic pulse motor, 
Inaba had a strong attachment to the technology, but also as a manager, he was caught between a 
rock and a hard place of having to look squarely at the limitations of his own technology. And it 
was from that experience that Inaba began to think that “Technology does have a history. However 
from the engineers’ point of view, there is no past, only creativity.” 
 
(2) Technical change from hard-wired to soft-wired by adopting MPU 
Later in 1975, Fanuc developed the FANUC 2000C NC equipment with Intel's 3000 series MPU. 
This was the world's first NC equipment with built-in MPU. Adoption of the MPU meant a shift 
from control using circuitry built with transistors and diodes, to control using software. In other 
words, this was a huge shift in NC architecture from the hard-wired to the soft-wired. NC device 
using MPU is called computerized numerical control (CNC), and is often distinguished from 
conventional NC. 
Technical issues that confronted the development of CNC were performance and reliability. 
 
“The biggest issue was whether a computer running software could process interpolation. We 
performed various simulations and actually tried things to find out what was possible and what 
could be known, but the interpolation issue was the biggest issue.… (abbreviated)… we used 
semiconductor memory, but the technology hadn't been properly established, and the 
manufacturer couldn't provide us with the right advice. For example, when using ICs, but we 
were groping for answers because we had no idea whether ICs could be mounted on printed 
circuit boards and connected together by etching the copper on the board, and we weren't sure 
how to increase reliability in terms of noise１４.” 
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To deal with these technical uncertainties, the company formed a new computerized NC 
design section in addition to its existing hardwired NC design section, and operated both 
departments simultaneously. The hardwired NC section was involved in developing NC for 
mass production using technology that had already been established, and its aim was to develop 
highly reliable NC at a low cost. On the other hand, the goals of the computerized NC section 
was to pay attention to the trends in cutting-edge semiconductor technologies and whether they 
could be incorporated into NC systems, and whether performance and reliability could be 
improved. Thus the technological and design objectives of both departments were completely 
different, so the organizations were separated. Director Kurakake said the following about that 
situation. 
 
“We completely split the organization into separate hardwired and computer sections. There 
was a manager overseeing the both sections at that time, and I was put in the computer section 
but had no lingering attachment at all to the hardwired section. I don't know what would have 
happened if we had tried to do it together. For my part I had absolutely no regrets about that, 
because we were able to do something new and get involved with the potential of computers １５.” 
 
In this way both sections worked in completely different directions, but were overseen by one 
person, director Kobayashi, and organizational consistency was sustained by him. 
 
“The manager oversaw both sections, so he knew the limitations of the current version of NC, 
and thus was able to see what needed to be done next, but there was a serious problem in trying 
to figure out how to develop beyond the current products which were creating revenue１６.” 
 
Then around 1978, the NC systems using semiconductor technologies had improved to the 
point where they would surpass the hardwired NC in terms of performance and reliability, and 
so the hardwired NC design section was absorbed into the computer NC design section. Until 
that time, the two technological systems of hardwired and soft-wired had existed in parallel, but 
it was in 1978 when the company technologically integrated the two into the computerized NC 
only. 
In 1978 Intel developed the MPU 8086, a single chip-type IC similar to those that we can still 
see today, and Fanuc developed its System 6 using the 8086 in 1979. The success of the System 
6 made Fanuc the first company in the world to adopt the 8086 for mass produced goods. After 
that, Intel went headlong into the PC business. However, for Fanuc, the success of 
implementing the 8086 was a decisive moment for Fanuc's triumph in the NC market. 
Compared to Fanuc, American NC manufacturers were not as proactive about implementing 
semiconductor technologies such as MPUs, which was a fatal move on their part. 
As described above, phase 2 did not only involve Fanuc maintaining business by sales 
activities and improvements and upgrades to existing NC systems with the total modularization 
of hardwired business that grew out of phase 1, but Fanuc also engaged in serious strategy 
change to deal with structural changes brought on by the oil shock and MPU. 
 
2.3. Phase 3 (1981 to present) 
(1) Developing Series 0, bestseller NC 
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By shifting technology from hardwired to soft-wired in the second phase, the new NC with 
product flexibility and expandability caused the market to grow significantly. This section will 
illustrate developing process of the Series 0, bestseller NC. The Series 0 went into mass 
production in September of 1985, and at the end of July 2004, 350,000 units had been shipped, 
becoming the #1 global bestseller computerized NC product.  
The Series 0 failure rate is 0.008 per month per unit with its extremely reliable technology. 
When using industrial goods like NC, the importance of reliability is higher than consumables, 
since if industrial goods breakdown, for example in an automobile factory, the production line 
has to be stopped. The concept behind the Series 0 was to use technologies accumulated up to 
that time, and to optimally equip the product with the most compact NC possible. Rather than 
redesigning to produce cutting-edge technologies, that meant polishing existing products, and 
finding new ways to assemble them. 
High reliability can only be achieved by the continuous accumulation of technology, and will 
never be achieved in a short space of time. Making new functions and adding them to existing 
products is one way to go, but products that are highly reliable are not brought about by adding 
something new, but by unceasingly rethinking the entire product, and in some cases, adding new 
functions can cause misalignments in entire systems, thus reducing the reliability of a product. 
It is also difficult to assess reliability. Functions and performance can be easily evaluated by 
actually trying them out. Similarly, the cutting speed and precision of NC machine tools can be 
easily measured by actually using them. However, malfunctions are often caused by on-site 
unplanned use of equipment, which is why it is difficult to evaluate product reliability.  
 
To improve reliability of hardware, it is important to reduce the number of components, and 
reduce the interdependency between components. For that reason, a range of parts such as 
custom LSI, hybrid ICs, printed circuits, power sources and display technologies were rapidly 
developed for the Series 0. And by using a thin display, the depth required for the display was 
reduced to about one third of that required for a CRT. As a result of these measures, the Series 0 
has twice the processing speeds of older equipment with about half as many parts. High 
reliability is the result of rethinking design based on accumulated technologies. 
There are 2 main factors behind the success of Series 0, both of which are innovations in a 
sense, the first being the total automation of Fanuc’s factory for high reliability, achieved by 
refined manufacturing and design, and the second being the development of new software 
architecture to promote  “user innovation” (Hippel, 2009). We describe these 2 factors in 
sequence. 
 
(2)Design for Manufacturing 
One reason for the success of the Series 0 was the accomplishment of a fully automated 
factory. One of Fanuc's strengths is its ability to substantially reduce costs with factory 
automation. The Series 0 was the first time the company achieved full automation. For that 
reason, the Series 0 hardware design had to be reconsidered from the point of view of 
manufacturing. In short, to achieve fully automated manufacturing consideration must be given 
from the beginning at the design stage. 
With NC manufacturing, firstly components have to be mounted onto printed circuit boards, 
which is a job done by automated machines. Then, once the components have been mounted 
onto printed circuit boards, each board must be tested, which is done automatically by a 
 13 
specialized testing machine to raise efficiency. Once testing is complete, several boards are 
assembled to create a single NC device, which is also done by a robot. Finally, the assembled 
NC devices are tested in another machine for overall performance. The Series 0 was the first 
product created with this type of full automation. Kurakake said the following: 
 
“The new thing here was the automated mounting, and automated assembly. Whereas 
previously factory workers had mounted circuit board components by hand, this was the first 
time we have achieved 100% automated mounting. The boards are assembled automatically 
using robots. This was also a new idea １７.” 
 
To achieve fully automated manufacturing like this, design concepts considering 
manufacturing are needed. Even with aligning components onto printed circuit board, design 
has to consider everything from component selection, how the robot can grab them, through to 
how to tighten screws. How big the screws need to be, where should the screw holes be… 
design has to consider everything down to the tiniest detail. That means right from the initial 
stages of design, the demands from manufacturing must be taken up, and meetings with 
manufacturing staff have to be held frequently. Kurakake had the following to say about design 
considerations. 
 
“For a robot to grab an object, it is necessary to include a hole on the device for the robot to 
grab. It's only a little modification, but if time is not given over to consider how the robot can 
grab component in the design, and the robot can't pick things up once the equipment has been 
built, then you are already losing the race. That the type of equipment deployed was designed in 
consideration of how to make something１８.” 
 
In this way, the success of the Series 0 was brought about by carefully accumulating 
technologies up to the time, improving reliability, and cooperation between design department 
and manufacturing department. 
 
(3)Meeting customer needs by transforming software architecture 
The second factor was the change of software architecture. The change in software 
architecture was to separate the area of user application software from basic software area 
controlled by Fanuc. Why this separation was useful? Because, this type of architecture enables 
both users and vendors to innovate independently of each other. This architecture enables users 
to satisfy their own demands by themselves, and concurrently vendors to satisfy their own needs 
independent of the user. In this sense, Fanuc changed software architecture from integral to 
modular. Here, we describe the background of this change of software architecture. 
One of the drivers that brought about this bestselling computerized NC system was to provide 
customized functions called custom-made macros to meet the diverse needs of end users. Using 
these customizable functions, machine tool manufacturers, or end users could freely make 
necessary function independently from Fanuc, which was enabled by Fanuc rebuilding its 
software architecture. 
Fanuc holds a 70% share of Japanese NC equipment. Therefore, for machine tool 
manufacturers, the big challenge is how to bring about product differentiation while using 
Fanuc's virtually ubiquitous NC equipment. Conventionally, in order to give machine tool 
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manufactures customized characteristics, they have to ask Fanuc to develop new functions. With 
this method, machine tool manufacturers would often demand further modifications, additional 
functions and once again ask Fanuc to make corrections or developments, which meant that all 
of the work ended up back at Fanuc. In short, machine tool manufacturers could not modify or 
add functions by themselves. Not only was this a huge inconvenience for both the machine tool 
manufacturers and Fanuc, but it also cost money. Regarding this situation, Kishi (Executive 
Director, November 1996), said the following: 
 
“Trying to get individual characteristics like that, machine tool manufacturers asked Fanuc to 
develop functions to certain specifications, and when those requests came we had to provide 
quotes for them, including how much time it would take. It meant that if the machine tool 
manufacturer wanted to add or modify a function to create their own features, there was no way 
that they could do it without us helping them１９.” 
 
The main reason for this was that the basic software involved with control hardware and 
application software involved with the user were blended together in the conventional NC 
software, which meant that basic software and application software both had to be modified to 
meet customization requests.  
Figure 6  Evolution of software architecture
Applications
(user modules)
C language library 
(toolkits)
Basic software 
(vendor modules)
Fanuc NC Hardware
NC software (Phase 2) NC software (Phase 3)
(Series 0)
Blending Change
Fanuc 
controlled
Users
 
To overcome this, Fanuc divided NC software as a whole into application sections that could 
be controlled by the user, and basic software section that could be controlled by the vendor as 
shown in Figure 6, and set up a C language library between them. The C language library is a 
software toolkit that for instance contains functions to display characters on screen or read 
keystrokes, and a range of internal NC input-output control functions for parameters and current 
cutting tool position and so forth. Machine tool manufacturers were thus able to freely assemble 
functions with the C language library to create their own screens, and display their own unique 
information. Without having to rely on Fanuc, they became able to add functions as they 
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pleased. 
Reconfiguring architecture this way enables the machine tool manufacturers as NC users and 
Fanuc as the NC vendor to independently innovate in parallel with each other. Fanuc was 
released from the diverse demands of machine tool manufacturers and end users, and was able 
to focus on improving its core technologies such as hardware and basic software. While on the 
other hand, machine tool manufacturers and end users were no longer affected by hardware and 
basic software changes made by Fanuc, and gained the ability to create unique functionality 
themselves. 
 
As described above, in phase 3, Fanuc achieved change of software architecture as well as full 
automation in its factories, and successfully made Series 0 bestseller CNC. 
 
 3. Conclusion: searching for New Growth Opportunities with global partner 
In 1986, GE and Fanuc set up a full equality joint-venture, each with 50% capital investment to 
work on CNC and PLC called GE Fanuc Automation Corporation (GE Fanuc). Headquartered 
in Charlottesville, Virginia in the United States, the company oversees 3 subsidiaries in North 
America, Europe and Asia. The extremely broad scope of this partnership extends across 
cooperation in development, manufacturing and marketing. To make it known that this was a 
partnership of full equality, Inaba suggested that the company should be called “GE Fanuc,” for 
“GEF” would not have sufficed. For this he gained understanding from GE. Anybody could 
easily guess what the initials GE stand for, but the F for Fanuc would be completely unknown. 
Obviously, personnel would come equally from both companies, and one person from GE and 
Fanuc each was sent to preside over the new company in a joint chairmanship system. 
Fanuc's globalization concepts are clearly apparent in this partnership with GE. Rather than 
relying purely on the company's own resources, its partnerships with trusted local companies for 
R&D, manufacture and marketing are horizontal cooperative relationships. For such 
relationships to be enabled, partners must be fully equal. Accordingly, mergers with local 
companies must on principle be based on 50-50 capital expenditure, regardless of whether 
they're in the West or in Asia. In building a cooperative relationship through a fully equal 
partnership with another company, Fanuc is able to help out with local production training, and 
aims to go beyond simple exporting as part of its globalization concepts. 
 
Notes 
                                                   
１ This case study was created with reference to interviews with persons involved, books, papers 
and published materials. In particular, we received a lot of help in the form of information 
and interviews provided to us by Fanuc. We would like to express our gratitude here. 
２ Refer to Inaba (2003). The yellow robot, Japan Industrial Journal, (in Japanese). 
３ Inaba (2003) 
４ Inaba (2003) 
５ The pulse monitor is characterized as follows: Firstly, it has applications in a wide range of 
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areas including large-size machine tools, and a diversity of NC control applications. 
Secondly, the electric hydraulic pulse monitor can be combined with machine tools by cogs 
and feed screws to create NC machine tools extremely easily. 
６ Inaba (2003) 
７ Inaba (2003) 
８Inaba (2003) 
９Inaba (2003) 
１０Inaba (2003) 
１１Inaba (2003) 
１２ Inaba (2003) 
１３ Inaba (2003) 
１４ Interview with Mitsuo Kurakake on 7 December 2000 (Executive Director at that time) 
１５ Interview with Mitsuo Kurakake on 7 December 2000 
１６ Interview with Mitsuo Kurakake on 7 December 2000 
１７ Interview with Mitsuo Kurakake on 7 December 2000 
１８ Interview with Mitsuo Kurakake on 7 December 2000 
１９ Interview with Hajimu Kishi on 7 December 2000 
